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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Appellant Daniel Parsons appeals following jury trial convictions for the offenses
of aiding and abetting robbery and felony eluding a peace officer as well as persistent
violator. Mr. Parsons here only challenges the persistent violator conviction/finding and
enhanced sentence based on it.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
While this matter was the subject of a jury trial, the facts were succinctly
described in the PSI:
... the attached police reports indicate that on 10/20/2010 co-defendant
Felicia Parsons, the defendant's wife, entered the Broadway Key Bank
wearing a wig, sunglasses, a black sweater and gloves, and handed bank
teller Paul Lucariello a note stating "WE HAVE GUNS! MONEY IN BAG!"
Mr. Lucariello put money into the bag Mrs. Parson had placed on his
counter, and observed Mrs. Parsons leave the bank and walk quickly from
the building. Branch manager Judy Batten pushed the alarm button and
summoned law enforcement.
Police located and began pursuing the defendants on 1-84. This defendant
was driving, weaving in and out of traffic at speeds far over the speed
limit, and through construction zones. The defendant eventually lost
control of his car, left the roadway and crashed into private property,
hitting a storage shed in the back yard at 15126 Ventia Ct., in Nampa, 10.
Officers secured the scene, had the defendants transported to Saint
Alphonsus Hospital for medical treatment, and ultimately transported them
to the Ada County Jail.
PSI, p. 2.
Mr. Parsons was charged by criminal complaint with aiding and abetting robbery
and felony eluding a police officer. (R. p. 13-14.) After a preliminary hearing he was
bound over to district court, where an information charged him with the above crimes.
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(R. p. 29, 38-39.)

Later, an information part" charged him with persistent violator. (R.

p. 107).
Mr. Parsons' case was tried to a jury (co-defendant Felicia Parsons pled guilty)
who found him guilty as charged. (R. p. 217-218.) The jury then found him to be a
persistent violator. (R. p. 219.)
The court sentenced Mr. Parsons to fixed life on the robbery, as well as a
consecutive fixed life sentence on the eluding as enhanced by the persistent violator.
(R. p. 226).
Appellant timely appeals. (R. p. 237.)
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ISSUE

WHETHER THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT ORALLY CHANGED A JURY
INSTRUCTION IN A CONFUSING WAY THAT COULD HAVE MISLED THE JURY
INTO BELIEVING THAT IT NEED NOT FIND AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE
BECAUSE IT HAD ALREADY BEEN ESTABLISHED
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ARGUMENT

THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT ORALLY CHANGED A JURY INSTRUCTION IN A
CONFUSING WAY THAT COULD HAVE MISLED THE JURY INTO BELIEVING
THAT IT NEED NOT FIND AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE BECAUSE IT HAD
ALREADY BEEN ESTABLISHED

A. Standard of Review

The standard of review for jury instruction issues was recently explained by the
Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Draper, 261 P.3d 853 (2011), by reference to other
recent Supreme Court cases:
"Whether jury instructions fairly and adequately present the issues and
state the applicable law is a question of law over which this Court
exercises free review. Therefore, the correctness of a jury instruction
depends on whether there is evidence at trial to support the instruction.
We look at the jury instructions as a whole, not individually, to determine
whether the jury was properly and adequately instructed. An erroneous
instruction will not constitute reversible error unless the instructions as a
whole misled the jury or prejudiced a party.

State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355 , 150 Idaho 355, 247 P.3d 582, 60001 (2010).
An error generally is not reviewable if raised for the first time on appeal.
Moreover, Idaho Criminal Rule 30(b) provides that "[n]o party may assign
as error the giving of or failure to give an instruction unless the party
objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating
distinctly the instruction to which the party objects and the grounds of the
objection."
However, this Court traditionally has reviewed "fundamental" errors on
appeal, even when no objection was raised at trial. An error is
fundamental when it "so profoundly distorts the trial that it produces
manifest injustice and deprives the accused of his fundamental right to
due process."

4

State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 748, 170 P.3d 886, 891 (2007).
State v. Draper, 261 P.3d at 864-865 (internal citations omitted).

The Idaho Supreme Court continued:
Draper's argument is that the jury instructions relieved the State of its duty
to prove all elements of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. If these
arguments are correct, Draper has been denied his right to due process
and those errors would rise to the level of fundamental error. "The United
States Supreme Court has held that in criminal trials 'the State must prove
every element of the offense, and a jury instruction violates due process if
it fails to give effect to that requirement.'" Anderson, 144 Idaho at 749, 170
P.3d at 892 (quoting Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437, 124 S. Ct.
1830, 158 L. Ed. 2d 701 (2004)). Here, if the instruction omitted a
contested element of the crime, it would have violated Draper's due
process rights and would consequently rise to the level of fundamental
error.
Id. at 865.

B. The

jUry

instructions

In this case, the instructional error is a sentence which the court added to the
oral instructions that does not appear in the written instructions. 1

Therefore, Appellant

will explain the sequence of events occurring in the trial court and provide verbatim the
oral instructions given with the offending language underlined.
After the jury returned its verdicts of guilty on the underlying offenses, the court
instructed it as follows:
Now, unfortunately, your job is not quite complete. We're going to take a
brief recess because we need to prepare the jury instructions on this. But I
will tell you that for the purpose of subjecting the defendant Daniel Dale
Parsons, Junior, to a more severe punishment, the defendant has been
charged in the information not only with the offense of aiding and abetting
robbery and eluding, on which charges you have now rendered your

1 Other than the one sentence, the written instructions and oral instructions are
substantially the same.
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verdict, but with being a persistent violator of the law in that as it is alleged
he has heretofore been at least two times convicted of a felony.
Idaho Code 19-2514 provides that any person convicted for a third time of
the commission of a felony shall be considered a persistent violator of the
law. This section does not create a new crime, but deals only with the
status of an accused and renders him liable to a greater punishment for
the latest conviction than that which might have been inflicted had there
not been two prior convictions.
The Defendant has denied the alleged prior convictions. You must now
determine and find whether or not the allegation of two or more prior
convictions is true.
For purpose of this finding, the following additional instructions will be
given to you which you'll consider along with the pertinent instructions
which have heretofore been given to you. We'll hear opening [sic]
argument at this time.
Tr. p. 616, In. 10-p. 617, In. 15.
The parties proceeded to give their opening statements. The court then gave
them the following instruction:
Before you present your first witness, I just want to indicate to the jury what
the state is alleging. Having found the defendant guilty of aiding and
abetting robbery and eluding you must next consider whether the
defendant has been convicted on at least two prior occasions of felony
offenses.
The state alleges the defendant has prior convictions as follows:
Count One, that the defendant, Daniel D. Parsons, Junior, on or about the
24th day of July, 1981, was sentenced after a conviction or guilty plea for
the crime of unlawful sale of a controlled substance, a felony, in the county
of Washoe, State of Nevada by virtue of that certain judgment of conviction
made and entered in Case No. C81-303; and, Count Two, that the
defendant, Daniel D. Parsons, Junior, on or about the 22nd day of May
1987, was sentenced after a conviction or guilty plea for commission of
conspiracy to commit robbery with the use of a firearm, a felony, in the
county of Washoe, state of Idaho--state of Nevada, by virtue of the certain
judgment of conviction made and entered in Case No. C86-1702; and/or,
Count Three, that the defendant, Daniel D. Parsons, Junior, on or about
the 22nd day of May 1987 was sentenced after a conviction or guilty plea
for the crime of burglary, a felony, in the county of Washoe, state of
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Nevada, by virtue of that certain judgment of conviction made and entered
in Case No. C86-1700; and/or, Count Four, that the defendant, Daniel D.
Parsons, Junior, on or about the 22nd day of May 1987, was sentenced
after a conviction or guilty plea for the crime of burglary, a felony, in the
county of Washoe, State of Nevada, by virtue of a certain judgment of
conviction made and entered in Case No. C86-1703.
The existence of a prior conviction must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt and your decision must be unanimous.
Tr. p. 618, In. 20-p. 620, In. 8.
After the evidence, the post proof instructions were as follows
Just as the State has the burden of proving all of the elements of the crime
of aiding and abetting robbery and eluding beyond a reasonable doubt, so
the state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant Daniel D. Parsons, Junior, has been convicted of at least two
prior felonies by finding the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt
at least two of the counts alleged in the Information Part II.
Thus in this case if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant has been convicted of at least two of the crimes listed
in Part II of the information and that each of the same two crimes is a
felony, then you should find that the defendant is a persistent violator of
the law. Should the evidence fail to prove this beyond a reasonable doubt,
then you should find the defendant is not a persistent violator of the law.
Now, for the purpose of this instruction, you must find that Count One has
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
In considering whether the Defendant is a persistent violator of the law,
you should not be influenced by the fact that you have heretofore found
him guilty of the crime of aiding and abetting robbery and eluding.
Your conclusion as to whether the defendant is a persistent violator of the
law must be based upon the evidence based on this issue uninfluenced by
the fact that the defendant has been convicted of aiding and abetting
robbery and eluding.
When you retire to the jury room, you will again elect one of your persons
as foreperson. Your verdict as to whether the defendant is a persistent
violator must be unanimous.
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When you have agreed upon your verdict, your foreman will sign the same
and you will return it into open court. A form of verdict suitable to any
conclusion you may reach will be submitted to you with these instructions.
Tr. p. 633, In. 2-p. 634, In. 19.
The parties then gave closing arguments. The prosecutor's argument was as
follows in relevant part:
The judge instructed you that you need to find Count One and what she
meant by that-or my reading of what she meant by that is there's this
judgment, which is the second to the last, page, the first page forward
from the blue page, which is-the case number's listed here in the upper
left and it's the 1981 conviction.
The remainder of the judgments have their case numbers also visible up
here on the left-hand upper corner and--however, they are all listed in the
text together. And so there's three different case numbers and three
charges; the burglary, the conspiracy to commit robbery with the use of a
firearm and being an ex-felon in the possession of a firearm.
And so what the instruction is calling on you to do is to determine that this
is in regard to Mr. Parsons and that at least one of these that are sort of
listed here together are also him that together he's been convicted twice
previously.
Because these are all listed on the same judgment, we ask you not to find
just two of these, but one of these and the one from the earlier dates
because there's more separation in time and it's more proper under the
rules and the law.
Tr. p. 635, In. 1-p. 636, In. 2.
After the jury went out, the court made the following record:
I want to make it really clear for the record that they had to find that the
first count was, in fact, proven because I think that's what the intent was
of the way in which we've written it. And even though it's not in the written
instructions, the law is very clear that the oral instructions are actually
what control.
I am not going to rewrite that because I think that the point-the point
here is we want to make sure that it cannot be later argued that they didn't
find him on the one, they just found him on these other three. I want to
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make it clear that they have to find the one before they find the rest of
them. Okay. Well just stand in recess. I would suggest don't go too far.
Tr. p. 637, Ins. 5-19.

C.

The district court erred by changing the oral instruction in a way that made it
confusing and could have misled the jUry into believing that Count I had already
been established and it must accept it
Again, the offending language which was added to the oral jury instruction was

as follows: "Now, for the purpose of this instruction, you must find that Count One has
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." As will be discussed below, this sentence
can mean two very different things.
The first meaning is what was intended by the state and the court. Unfortunately,
the state and court did not accomplish what it set out to do with the added language.
While it can be determined from the full record what has going on, it would not have
been clear to the jury which was instructed as above.
As can be gleaned from the prosecutor's remarks and the record made by the
court outside the presence of the jury, the reason the court modified the instruction and
inserted the additional language is because the state's Information Part II alleged four
prior felony convictions which it charged as Count I--IV.

Count I was a conviction

occurring in 1981, and Counts II, III & IV were convictions all occurring on May 22,
1987. So the point of the instruction was that the state (and court) wanted the jury to
find 1) that the 1981 conviction did occur, and 2) that one of the three convictions
occurring on May 22, 1987, did occur, for a total of two prior felony convictions. What
the state (and court) did not want to happen is for the jury to find that the two
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convictions upon which the persistent violator was based both occurred on May 22,
1987.
While this is the idea that the state (and court) wanted to impart, it is not
necessarily what the instruction impartred. One interpretation of the instruction may
well be that the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the conviction listed in
Count I really occurred. But even this

interpretation is confusing, where Count I is

singled out and so appears to be the subject of special treatment.
Worse still is the other interpretation of that instruction, which is the court was
instructing the jury that said conviction in Count I had in fact occurred (similar to when
the court instructs a jury on a stipulation). This is a reasonable interpretation as well,
given the verb tense, a comparison with the portion of the instruction immediately
preceding it, and because the sentence is really an unexplained non-sequitor dropped
into the instructions. If the jury interpreted it this way, it would then believe that all it
needed to do was to find that one other conviction occurred, which when combined with
Count I, provided the required two prior convictions.
It cannot be seriously argued that the instruction as given is not confusing. At
the very least this is shown by the prosecutor's struggles to explain what the instruction
meant in her closing argument. 2 But even if the prosecutor was successful in imparting
the notion that the jury had to use the earlier conviction and one of the later convictions,
it still would not disabuse the jury of the very problem with the instruction, which is it
seems like the court instructed the jury that Count One had been established and so

However, the prosecutor's interpretation of what the court meant cannot substitute for
a correct instruction from the court, particularly since the court also instructed the jury
that it is the court's instruction which the jury must follow. (R. p. 194.)
2
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they only needed to find one of the three later counts to find the defendant is a
persistent violator. Additionally, while the court made its record about what it was trying
to do, it did not do so before the jury, and so it does not clarify the instruction the jury
received.
In short, the instruction here is confusing and could have misled the jury. It is
impossible to say that the jury could not have read the instruction as eliminating the
necessity that it decide whether Mr. Parsons had been convicted of a felony in 1981.
This reading would relieve the state of its burden of proving every element beyond a
reasonable doubt as required by the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution. Thus, this issue is reviewable for the first time on appeal as
fundamental error as explained in Draper, supra.
Further, Appellant asserts that harmless error does not apply and the error is per
se reversible. This is not the case of a mere missing element whereby harmless error
review is allowable as per State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,245 P.3d 961,976 (2010).
Rather, Appellant asserts that the error is more akin to the court directing a verdict on
that element. This is because the instruction does not simply ignore an element that
the jury has to find, but rather, appears to direct the jury that the element has already
been found so rather than the jury needing to find two prior convictions, it needed only
find one more in addition to the apparently already established conviction.
Of course, a court cannot direct a verdict against a defendant nor the jury
directed to come forward with a such verdict.

The United States Supreme Court

reaffirmed this principle in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1999):
Justice Scalia, in dissent, also suggests that if a failure to charge on an
uncontested element of the offense may be harmless error, the next step
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will be to allow a directed verdict against a defendant in a criminal case
contrary to Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578, 92 L. Ed. 2d 460, 106 S. Ct.
3101 (1986). Happily, our course of constitutional adjudication has not
been characterized by this "in for a penny, in for a pound" approach. We
have no hesitation reaffirming Rose at the same time that we subject the
narrow class of cases like the present one to harmless-error review.
Id., n. 2.

The case referred to, Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (U.S. 1986), explained as
follows:
Similarly, harmless-error analysis presumably would not apply if a court
directed a verdict for the prosecution in a criminal trial by jury. We have
stated that "a trial judge is prohibited from entering a judgment of
conviction or directing the jury to come forward with such a verdict ...
regardless of how overwhelmingly the evidence may point in that
direction." This rule stems from the Sixth Amendment's clear command to
afford jury trials in serious criminal cases. Where that right is altogether
denied, the State cannot contend that the deprivation was harmless
because the evidence established the defendant's guilt; the error in such a
case is that the wrong entity judged the defendant guilty.
Id., p. 578 (internal citations omitted).

By analogy to Rose, harmless error is not the proper test because the instruction
appears to in part direct a verdict against the defendant because it appears to provide
that the 1981 felony had already been established and the jury must accept it. Given
this, harmless error review should not apply and instead the error is per se reversible.
Therefore, both the jury convictionlfinding of persistent violator and its resulting fixed
life sentence for the felony eluding must be reversed and vacated.
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CONCLUSION
Wherefore, for all the reasons above, Mr. Parsons requests this Court reverse
and vacate the persistent violator finding/conviction and the enhanced life sentence for
/

eluding police.
DATED this

dr'-

II

day of March, 2012.

IF ATE OF SERVICE

.

d

t---

I HEREBY CERTIFY at on this \
day of March, 2012, I served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, by the method as
indicated below:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATEHOUSE, ROOM 210
P.O. BOX 83720
BOISE, 1083720-0010

13

